|Title||Against McGinn’s Mysterianism|
|Publication Type||Journal Article|
|Year of Publication||2016|
|Journal||Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi|
|Pagination||1 - 10|
|Keywords||Colin McGinn, Mysterianism, cognitive closure, the mind-body problem|
There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.
Against McGinn’s Mysterianism