Against McGinn’s Mysterianism

TitleAgainst McGinn’s Mysterianism
Publication Type Journal Article
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsDemircioğlu, Erhan
JournalKilikya Felsefe Dergisi
Issue1
Pagination1 - 10
Date Published2016
Publication Languageeng
ISSN2148-7898
E-ISSN2148-9327
KeywordsColin McGinn, Mysterianism, cognitive closure, the mind-body problem
Abstract

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted.

Full Text

Undefined