On the Differentia of Epistemic Justification

TitleOn the Differentia of Epistemic Justification
Publication Type Journal Article
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsDemircioğlu, Erhan
JournalKilikya Felsefe Dergisi
Issue1
Pagination1 - 10
Date Published2017
ISSN2148-7898
E-ISSN2148-9327
KeywordsEpistemic Justification, Justification, Pragmatic Justification, The Cognitive Goal of Truth
Abstract

How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it? According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there are cases in which pragmatic justification for believing a proposition is related to the cognitive goal of arriving at truth in a way epistemic justification is supposed to be. The paper will close with a brief assessment of two possible rejoinders the received view might make to my objection.

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