|Title||On the Differentia of Epistemic Justification|
|Publication Type||Journal Article|
|Year of Publication||2017|
|Journal||Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi|
|Pagination||1 - 10|
|Keywords||Epistemic Justification, Justification, Pragmatic Justification, The Cognitive Goal of Truth|
How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it? According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there are cases in which pragmatic justification for believing a proposition is related to the cognitive goal of arriving at truth in a way epistemic justification is supposed to be. The paper will close with a brief assessment of two possible rejoinders the received view might make to my objection.
On the Differentia of Epistemic Justification